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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR VALLEY COUNTY (IN THE (PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION)
(INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION) OF THE STATE OF IDAHO)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
-vsBRIAN C. KERR,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
Dist. Court No. CR-2015-4470-C

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley.

Honorable Jason D. Scott, District Judge
Presiding

Kenneth Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLATE

Daniel W. Bower
12550 W Explorer Dr. Suite 100
Boise, ID 83713

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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Date: 1/4/2017

Fourth Judicial District Court - Valley County

Time: 09:33AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of2

User: CWHITE

Case: CR-2015-0004470-C Current Judge: Jason Scott
Defendant: Kerr, Brian Calder

State of Idaho vs. Brian Calder Kerr

Misdemeanor
Judge

Date
12/4/2015

12/9/2015

Notice Of Appearance, Plea Of Not Guilty And Demand For Jury Trial

Lamont C. Berecz

Defendant: Kerr, Brian Calder Appearance Gabriel M Haws

Lamont C. Berecz

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (136-1603 FIG-Trespass on Cultivated
Lands in Violation of Warning Signs, or Marked Boundaries)

Lamont C. Berecz

New Case Filed - Misdemeanor

Lamont C. Berecz

Prosecutor assigned Valley County Prosecutor

Lamont C. Berecz

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/15/2015 09:30 AM) Trespass to
retrieve wild life

Lamont C. Berecz

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 12/15/2015 09:30 AM:
Hearing Vacated Trespass to retrieve wildlife

Lamont C. Berecz

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 02/08/2016 10:00 AM)

Lamont C. Berecz

Notice Of Hearing

Lamont C. Berecz

12/10/2015

State's Notice of Response To Defendant's Request for Discovery

Lamont C. Berecz

2/8/2016

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 02/08/201610:00 AM: Lamont C. Berecz
Hearing Held
A Plea is entered for charge: -GT (136-1603 FIG-Trespass on Cultivated
Lands in Violation of Warning Signs, or Marked Boundaries)

Lamont C. Berecz

Defendant's Written Plea Of Guilty

Lamont C. Berecz

Order Setting Hearing

Lamont C. Berecz

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 03/14/2016 02:20 PM)

Lamont C. Berecz

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 03/14/2016 02:20 PM:
Disposition With Hearing

Lamont C. Berecz

Court Accepts Guilty Plea

Lamont C. Berecz

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action

Lamont C. Berecz

Sentenced To Pay Fine 665.00 charge: 136-1603 FIG-Trespass on
Cultivated Lands in Violation of Warning Signs, or Marked Boundaries

Lamont C. Berecz

Other Sentencing Option Imposed:: Other Hours assigned: O Terms:
Update Hunter Education/Safety Class and Sent Proof To Court to be
completed by 9/14/2016

Lamont C. Berecz

4/11/2016

Supplemental Brief

Lamont C. Berecz

4/13/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/17/2016 03:30 PM)

Lamont C. Berecz

Notice Of Hearing

Lamont C. Berecz

Motion For An Order To Appear Telephonically

Lamont C. Berecz

Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For An Order To
Appear Telephonically

Lamont C. Berecz

5/9/2016

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion To Appear Telephonically

Lamont C. Berecz

5/10/2016

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 05/10/2016 03:30 PM: Lamont C. Berecz
Hearing Held Telephonic #204950

3/14/2016

5/2/2016

Case Taken Under Advisement

Lamont C. Berecz

5/31/2016

Memorandum Decision

Lamont C. Berecz

7/12/2016

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Lamont C. Berecz
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Date: 1/4/2017

Fourth Judicial District Court - Valley County

Time: 09:33 AM

ROA Report

Page 2 of 2

User: CWHITE

Case: CR-2015-0004470-C Current Judge: Jason Scott
Defendant: Kerr, Brian Calder

State of Idaho vs. Brian Calder Kerr

Misdemeanor
Date

Judge

8/2/2016

Order Establishing Appellate Procedure

Jason Scott

9/2/2016

Appellant's Brief

Jason Scott

9/6/2016

Change Assigned Judge

Jason Scott

9/15/2016

Respondent's Brief

Jason Scott

10/5/2016

Appellant's Reply Brief

Jason Scott

10/18/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 11/21/2016 10:00 AM)

Jason Scott

Notice Of Hearing

Jason Scott

Motion To Continue Oral Argument

Jason Scott

Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Conitnue Oral Argument

Jason Scott

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 11/21/2016
10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Jason Scott

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 12/19/2016 03:00 PM)

Jason Scott

Notice Of Hearing

Jason Scott

11/3/2016
11/21/2016

11/22/2016
12/19/2016

1/4/2017

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 12/19/2016
03:00 PM: Hearing Held

Jason Scott

Opinion On Appeal

Jason Scott

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Jason Scott

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Jason Scott
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE _)i,_._____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
Vl.j
·

Vo-.l

STATE OF IDAHO
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.,.
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Date
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·

Serial #/Address

Defendant's Signature

Officer
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Serial .#/Address

···:,;3)1

Witnessing Officer

I hereby certify service upon the defen

~/J4t.J)-\'3)3cf.~~
t DF<."

Dept.

DEC Q9 2015'

t personally on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 19 _ _

Case No,____ lnst. No.._ __
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P-M.
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Log of lV-COURTROOMl 0¥8/2016

Description KERR, BRIAN CALDER CR-2015-4470-C

JUDGE LAMONT C BERECZ
PROSECUTOR: VALLEY COUNTY
DEFENSE COUNSEL: GABRIEL M. HAWS
CLERK: C. WHITE
BAILIFF: J. REDMON
Date 2/8/2016

Time

Location

1V-COURTROOM1

Speaker

Note

10:59:57 AM Judge.

Calls case.

11:00:13 AM Judge

Believe I gave the signed plea agreement back.

11:00:22 AM Defense
Counsel

Yes, approach

Yes.
11 :00:

udge

fore the court on PTC for trespass to retrieve wildlife.

11:00:56 AM Defense
Counsel

Pleading to 36-1603 A

11:01:13 AM Defense
Counsel

Please interlineate with 16

11:01:20 AM

Judge

Understand pleading GT to this charge. Understand the
agreement?

Yes

Are you under the influence of any alcohol or drugs?
hreat or force to enter GT plea?
Enough time with your attorney?
Advises defendant of rights. Understand?
11 :02:21 AM Judge
· 11 :02:22 AM
Defendant

I plead GT. I went onto cultivated land to retrieve an elk that I
shot on public land lawfully. I did not ask the owners of the land
for permission to go onto property.
0005
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2/8/2016

IN THE DISTIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICI!Dl)-THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF,-~~~:.w:,,.--..THE STA TE OF IDAHO

FEB O8 2016

)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

case
FtlP-<1

j ['. 7-0 A.M,111St._No._ _ _P.M.

)

CASE NO. CR-2015-4470-C

)
)
)

DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN GUILTY PLEA

Brian C. Kerr

)

Defendant.

)
)
)

D Defendant Representing Self or
~Defendant Represented by Attorney

I, Brian C. Kerr, the above-named defendant, desire to plead guilty as set forth below, to the charge(s) in this case, I am
years of age and have had .k!/_ years of education. I am not under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or other mindaffecting substances at this time. I am fully aware of the present proceedings and of their legal significance. I have decided to plead
guilty (check one of the following):
D after careful consideration on my own, or
IZI after discussion of this matter with my attorney, Gabriel M. Haws.
No one has made any promises, threats, or other inducements to get me to plead guilty in this action. IfI am on probation or parole,
this guilty plea may be used against me as the basis for a probation or parole violation.
I understand that the judge is not bound by any plea agreement between the state and me, and the maximum punishment allowed
under state law has been explained to me. I am aware that the Court may impose conditions of probation in my sentencing. The only
agreement that has been made in this case is as follows:

~

Defendant pleads guilty to tresspass to retrieve wildlife, a violation ofldaho Code section 36-1603(a) in
exchange for state capp.ing its sentencing recommendatio-~ year unsupervised probation, 30 days of
jail with 30 suspended, $500 fine plus cow:t costs, $750 c ·
tmd processing pettttlty, one (1) year
hunting and fishing license suspension, and-tislumd_game will confiscat~ih~ bull elk; State will dismiss charges
against co-defendants Garrett B Kerr and Jeffrey J. Peterson; Defendnat is free to argue for less; Defendant
requests the court vacate the pre-trial conference date and set this case for sentencing hearing.

E.

In entering this guilty plea, I am fully aware that I am waiving any defenses I may have to these charges. Additionally, I may be
ed to submit an evaluation{s) for sentencing and I am waiving certain important rights such as:
~ o be represented by an attorney, and have one appointed if I cannot afford one ..
,'( IZ! To require the state to prove every element of my charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
IZ! To enter a plea in open court before a judge.
IZI To appeal this conviction, although the sentence may be appealed.
IZI To have a jury trial or court trial.
IZI To not be compelled to testify against myself.
D To personally address the court prior to sentencing.
IZ! To confront witnesses against me and subpoena my own witnesses.
THEREFORE, I hereby authorize entry of a guilty plea on my behalf and authorize my attorney (if applicable) to enter a guilty plea in
the above-captioned action, pursuant to M.C.R. 6(d) and State v. Poynter, 34 Idaho 504, 205 P. 56 l, 208 P. 871 (1921 ). This plea is
given knowingly. intelligently. and voluntarily.
DATED thi5 5th

~
... 17</·.,;,.;
(' /'J\.__
Defendant

. . . . day of l·ehruary, 2015.

-

~
~

Address: 252 W. Meadow Ridge

Lane, Eagle.

Idaho 83616
Phone: (208)861-7110
Magistrate Judge
0007
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Log of 1V-COURTROOMl w/14/2016

Description KERR, BRIAN CALDER CR-2015-4470-C

Page 1 of 4

JUDGE: LAMONT C. BERECZ
PROSECUTOR: VALLEY COUNTY
DEFENSE COUNSEL: GABRIEL M HAWS
CLERK: J. HON
BAILIFF: C. WHITE

Date 3/14/2016

Time

Location

Speaker

II 1V-COURTROOM1
Note

02:37:20 PM Judge

Calls case

02:37:25 PM State

Recess for 5 minutes to speak to Fish and Game?

02:37:36 PM

Recess

02:41:47 PM Judge

Recalls case

02:41:57 PM

Present with counsel; having plead GT; Plea agreement for the
record, free to argue for less

Judge

02:42:42 PM Judge

I will hear from the state

02:42:51 PM

Review of case for the record. That property did not allow people
to hunt, actually shot the Elk on Public Property and died on
Private property. May I show exhibits?

State

02:44:1~r~-r-· ..:_nt I object; charge with trespass not unlawful taking
•• ". -• ~""
02·-~~-V'T
I

I will over rule; something that I can consider

02:44:52 PM
State

Photo of heart, lungs, and trees on property. Further statement
for the record. I have a F & G Officer Rowley here in the
courtroom for a statement. No prior record, further agreement
and history of the case for the record. Also shows the antlers
(trophy Elk)

Judge

So let me understand .... suggesting that he did not shoot the elk
on private property?

State

Further comments for the court. F & G wants 1 year license
suspension and keep the elk. Wanting to call Officer Rowley

IYI

02:47:10 PM
02:47:42 PM

1-

02:48:56 PM Officer
Rowley

<SWORN>

02:49:09 PM

Officer
Rowley

States name for the record; work experience; 2nd officer on this;
showed up right before Mr Kerr was leaving; Fellow officer
explained to me what had happened; animal had ran and where
they were processing it. Look for evidence; blood, track; I have
found none; no tracks that the animal had been running; Mr. Kerr
had access from the high water mark; went west and walked a
good distance; moist and mudding, no boot prints; small creek
0008
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Log of IV-COURTROOMI ./14/2016

-

Page2 of4

coming at an angle; followed that; no prints along the creek;
returned to elk; cut out vital organs; took photos at that point
found no blood track; getting dark. returned the next morning,
looked for any sign for where the elk had ran; blood spot was 1/4
mile from property. The entire property was fenced; flood irrigated
with cows
Mr Haws?
02:54:09 PM Defense
Counsel
02:54:19 PM
Officer
Rowley

Review of Photo of the Elk's heart, I don't have that particular
information; yes, After Officer Hunter arrived, yes, yes, I did not
fine the bullet; Officer Hunter said it was a pass thru; no; there
was nothing to stop it; we did not, we did not, He was not charged
with that, I am not aware; I was the secondary officer on this
case, when I arrived, they were at that spot; distance for the first
point, no, yes we did, no, no,

02:57:29 PM Ju
No
Further recommendations?
No
Mr Haws?
02:58:09 PM
Defense
Counsel

Presents exhibit to the court and explains the location of the
animal. The property is not marked; there is a fence; flood
irrigation, there is approximately 1 mile that is public land. Further
statements for the court on the Defendant. Evidence shows that
this animal was lawfully taken. Prove a negative. Appropriate
sentence and puts on the record. Further Review of the case for
the record. Irrigated and cultivated

Judge

So he thought he could?

Defense
Counsel

Continued statements about the retrieving the meat and
harvesting it. Could have been mistaken about the law. 30 Hours
of Community Service; no license restriction and explains for the
36-202 code for the record. No unlawful taking in this case. 361404 B reviewed for the court and read into the record. Evidence

03:04:14 PM

to show it was not unlawful taking. Asking for an Order that the
animal be released to Mr. Kerr. 36-1402 E reviews for the record
and reads into the record. Corrected Sub-section D.
03:09:05 P

dge

03:09:25 PM Defense
Counsel
03:10:07 PM Judge
03:11:00 PM
Defense

You might be looking at an old ... look at your pocket supplement.
Continued statements for the court on the code.
larification of license suspension
Continued Statements
0009
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Log of IV-COURTROOM! w/14/2016

Counsel

Page 3 of 4

03:11:09 PM State

Final comment

03:11 :16 PM Judge

If it is brief

03:11:26 PM

State

Further comments for the court; the landowner is still not allowing
the taking of the animal.

h1rlae

Response?

03:12:22 PM

03:12:28 PM Defense
Counsel

Continued comments.

03:13:15 PM Judge

Mr. Kerr, anything you want to say before sentence?

03:13:34 PM

Statement for the court. Hunting history for the court. Tracking
experience and further information for the court. Did take him on
Defendant public land. Officers were out to get us from the beginning. I have
learned from the process. Doing our best to harvest and
appreciate your consideration.

03:17:28 PM Judg~
03:17:55 PM

Judge

03:23:39 PM Defense
Counsel
03:23:55 PM Judge
03:23:59 PM Defense
Counsel
03:24:45 p~.

,...

-

nk you.
Certainly an interesting case; I don't know that.. ... I am not going
to agree that the only evidence was taking lawfully. I have not
hear the case. The state has presented the evidence that you
took the elk on private property. Continued comments to the
Defendant, very different offense. Bottom line I cannot say that
you did or you didn't. For purpose of sentencing I have to
sentence you on what you plead guilty to. In terms of forfeiting
the elk; you ought to loss that; taking lawfully is not defined in the
statue, shooting and retrieving it; went onto private land to take it
and you trespassed; even if I accept it was taken on public land. I
find that it is appropriate; forfeiter the meat and antlers to fish and
game; give free to others.
Short motion to reconsider?
11Yes
Taking and explanation for the court. Retrieve is not included.
Asking to reconsider; excluded from the code
' I ,..,..., ,..,.._,•thing?
'J
- .,
·•

03:24:49 PM Judge

yes

03:24:52 PM State

It's the issue of possession

03:25:01 PM Defense
Counsel

Unlawful possession; was not charged with that?

03:25:28 PM State

Clarification for the court of the code

03:25:4: -~.- Judge

Take and the meaning from the code; unlawful taking clarification.

03:26:13 PM
Reconsideration; unlawfully in possession of Mr Kerr; so while ....
I

00010
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Judge
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Page4 of4

36-202 Taking unlawfully. I am concerned that is going to look
like I am going to split the baby; and further clarification for the
record.

03:27:44 P

I am not going to suspend you license

03:28: 11 PM Judge

there is an argument on both sides. I am going to impose
$500.00 fine, cc $165. for total of$

03:29:22 PM

I am going to require you to complete an updated hunting class
and send to court within 6 months in lieu of license suspension.
Understand?

Judge
3:30:17 PM
03:30:20 PM

sign the order for Forfeiture

------=

I am wanting to back to the Forfeiture; maybe legal briefing, I
would like 6 weeks to file that motion before you sign that Order.
uld give you 45; let's say 30 days to do that.
r Rowley, imperative that something was wrong.
Motion to reconsider, I will give the 30 days
Adjourned
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT VA'rly,
_2GIUDGMENT

_PROBATION ORDER

),aputy

_WITHHELD JUDGMENT

STAtE OF IDAHO vs.
BRIAN CALDER KERR

case No. _ _ _ _1nst. ~-

###-##-

SS#

Flleu.d_ _ ____.A.M.

S;OU

P.M.

DEFENDANT having been charged with:

;l

ii

Count 1: Tres ass to retrieve wildlife 136-1603
Count 2: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Count 3: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
DEFENDANT having been advised of all rights & penalties per ICR 5, 11, IMCR 5(f)

I

DEFENDANT WAS "g]Present

O

CASE#

CR-2015-0004470-C

Not Present

~ a s represEfuted by:
~efendant Waived:
Right To:

}zrRight Against Self-Incrimination ~Jury Trial
~Confront & Cross Examination

COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT AFTER: ~oluntary Guilty Plea
0 WITHHELD JUDGMENT - bpires:_ _ _ _-_ _ _ __

0

.D Counsel
O Trial: Found Guilty

Ji!

All Defenses

ORDERED: DEFENDANT'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED _ _ days beginning _ _ _ _ _ _ .: and/or

D

INTERLOCK Dates: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ OWith Restricted License

D Absolute Suspension

0 DEFENDANT IS ORDER~D TO PAY TO THE CLERK:Time to pay~dayOPay within monthsO /mo th be in on
Count 1: Fine/Penalty !f
~w/$ ~
Suspended+ CT.COSTS$ ~
= $ Total--t6-'IH-=t--Count 2: Fine/Penalty$_____ w/$ _ _ _ _ _ _ Suspended+ CT.COSTS$___
=$Total _ _ _ __
=$Total _ _ _ __
Count 3: Fine/Penalty$_____ w/$ _ _ _ _ _ _ Suspended+ CT.COSTS$___
Community
Public
Probation
Prosecution
Service Ins.$_ _ _ Defender$____ Fees$ _ _ Restitution$___ Costs$___ * Total $ _ _ _ _ __

<13.p!li

Ii] All cash bonds will be applied to the fines/court costs/restitution owed and any balance remaining will be returned.
**PAY TO: Valley County, PO Box 1350, Cascade, ID 83611 - PH. 208-382-7178 - Fax 208-382-7184 (include Case
No.)**

0

DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO BE INCARCERATED FOR:

Count 1: _ _ _ _ _ _ daysW/ _ _ _ _ _ _ Suspended - Credit._ _ _ _ _ _ _=Total _ _ _ _ _ __
Count 2: _ _ _ _ _ _ days W / _ _ _ _ _ _ Suspended - Credit._ _ _ _ _ _ _= Total _ _ _ _ _ __
Count 3: _ _ _ _ _ _ days W / _ _ _ _ _ _ Suspended - Credit._ _ _ _ _ _ _= Total _ _ _ _ _ __

D ___ Days to be served at the discretion of the Probation Officer. D __ hours community service in lieu of jail
0 PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Probation Expires: _ _ _ _ _ _ (_Supervised) (_Unsupervised)
D Enroll/ complete treatment program(s) marked on Judgment Supplement.
D Report to Probation Officer at 550 Deinhard Lane, McCall, ID - 634-4131, within 5 days, sign and comply with
standard probation agreement. Probation Officer:)

Iii No alcohol or controlled substance in bodily system on reporting to jail or during service of jail.
D R_efuse no evidentiary test for drugs or alcohol with or without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Iii Commit no crime Iii Pay all Fines, Costs, Restitution, and Reimbursements. iJNotify Court of any address change.
D Defendant accepted terms and conditions of probation and received copy of this form and Judgment Supplement (if
applicable).

D File proof of completion of
hours of Community Service for Non-Profit or Government agency by_ _ _ __
D File substance abuse / alcohol evaluation. wit~ Cou by
~ ~;W1 ~ns f}~af/f,)£ r:;7,t,r
-~ther

Date of Judgment/Order: \
---,l'-1-~~,--~~7

cc: :::6.Defendant }{_ P.A.

b. P

00012

0510212016

14:04

P.0021009

'"'-"'-1Jil'.ll.A MILLER, CLERK
BY·---.1~~""------Deputy

Gabriel M. Haws, ISB # 6999
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83 713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.:
(208) 345-4461
ghaws@stm-law.com

MAY O2 2016
Case No, _ _ _ ln;)~·
Filed

AM._,/

7

P.M.

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COUR1" OF THE FOURTI·I JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF VALLEY
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C

MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY

vs.

BRIAN C. KERR,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, above-named Defendant, by and though counsel of record, Stewart
Taylor & Morris PLLC. pursuant to Rule 7(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and
moves this Court for an order permitting counsel for the Defendant to appear telephonically for
hearing scheduled for Tuesday, May 10, 2016, at 3:30 p.m. An Affidavit of Counsel setting

forth the basis for this Motion is filed contemporaneously herewith,

MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO APPEAR TELEPI-IONICALLY - 1
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DATED this

$

~

P.003/009

day of May, 2016.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS

PLLC

Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALL Y

VS.

BRIAN C. KERR,
Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for an Order to
Appear Telephonically ("Defendant's Motion"), and the Court having reviewed Defendant's
Motion and accompanying Affidavit of Counsel in support of the same, and good cause
appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and that on Tuesday,
May 10, 2016, at 3:30 p.m. Defendant'sJcounsel shall call the Court at the following phone
nwnber

ao-B 222· ffi:!<> ,

{!__o

e ¥ ~ot/960

for the hearing scheduled herein.

DATED t h i s ~ day of May, 2016.

Lamont . Berecz
Magistrate Judge
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y - 1
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P.M.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~day of May, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Valley County Prosecutor's Office
219 N. Main St.
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611
Gabriel M. Haws
& MORRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
STEWART TAYLOR

g
D
D
D

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124
Email:
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 345-4461
Email:

By: Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJ£
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OW11.M1~
8Y.-~~::;.u_...:::::__ _ Oeputy

STATE OF IDAHO,

CaseNo~
CASE NO. CR-lltl's-2f47()-C A.M
;··~,a;-P.-.M.

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

BRIAN CALDER KERR,
Defendant.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Brian Kerr was cited on October 15, 2015, by Fish and Game Officers for the charge of
''Trespass to retrieve wildlife (trophy bull elk) on cultivated land (artificially irrigated pasture)
without permission from the landowner" a violation of Idaho Code § 36-1603(a). On February
8, 2016, Kerr pied guilty to the offense as charged.
This trespassing offense is a misdemeanor under the Fish and Game statutes. As such, it
carries with it a possible fine of between $25 to $1,000 and a jail sentence of up to 6 months.

See I.C. § 36-1402(b). Additionally, Kerr faced a possible suspension of his hunting (or fishing
or trapping) privileges for up to 3 years.
At sentencing, on March 14, 2016, per the parties' settlement agreement, the State argued
that the bull elk which Kerr shot should be confiscated to Fish and Game pursuant to LC. § 36l 304(b ). Kerr argued that he ought to be able to keep the elk despite his trespass and that I.C. §
36- l 304(b) was inapplicable to his case'.
The Court ultimately imposed a fine, a requirement for a hunter safety class, and ordered
the elk to be forfeited to the Department of Fish of Game. Kerr asked for reconsideration of the
Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page

1
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forfeiture (technically a confiscation) and permission to brief the issue. The Court granted Kerr
time to brief the issue. The State did not respond to Kerr's briefing. On May 10, 2016, the Court
considered again the issue of the elk's confiscation and took the matter under advisement.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
There is no question that Kerr trespassed onto another person's property, which was
cultivated land, in order to retrieve a bull elk that had been shot. Those facts are not in dispute
because that is what Kerr was charged with and to which he pled guilty.
At sentencing, the State presented the testimony of a Fish and Game officer, as well as
photographic exhibits, which tended to prove that Kerr shot the elk on the same private property
that he trespassed upon. Kerr did not testify at the sentencing hearing but his counsel argued
Kerr's account- that account being that Kerr shot the elk while on public land and that the elk
then ran onto the private property where it expired before Kerr retrieved it. Counsel for Kerr
argued that a witness' account of hearing the gunshot would substantiate Kerr's account.
This factual dispute was not resolved by the Court as it was not necessary to Kerr's plea
of guilty to the charge. Nevertheless, Kerr wants the Court to accept that he lawfully shot the elk
before trespassing. Kerr argues that because the State did not charge him with illegally taking
the elk under LC.§ 36-1404 and did not request a processing fee under LC.§ 36-1404 that the
State tacitly agrees that he took the elk lawfully. That is, Kerr urges this Court to make a finding
that Kerr "lawfully took" the elk based on the prosecutor's charging decisions. At the hearing on
reconsideration, the prosecutor argued that he had the evidence to charge Kerr with illegally
taking the elk but exercised his discretion to prosecute the trespass in order to resolve the case.
Divining the underlying facts of a case from a prosecutor's exercise of their discretion is
an undertaking fraught with speculation. To the extent Kerr asks this Court to accept his version

Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 2
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that he shot the elk lawfully, this Court declines to make that factual finding. Likewise, to the
extent the State asks this Court to look at the evidence presented at sentencing and make a
factual finding that he shot the elk while in the act of trespassing, this Court declines to make
that factual finding.
What the Court finds factually is that Kerr shot a bull elk which died on someone's
private property. Kerr trespassed onto that property to retrieve the elk. The issue thus becomes:
does I.C. § 36-1304(b) apply to these facts? I.C. § 36-1304(b) reads:
(b) Unlawfully Taken Wildlife--Seizure, Confiscation, Disposition.
(i) The director or any other officer empowered to enforce the fish and game laws
may at any time seize and take into his custody any wildlife or any portion thereof
which may have been taken unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the
possession of any person. If it appears from the evidence before the magistrate
hearing the case that said wildlife was unlawfully taken, the magistrate shall:
1. Order the same confiscated or sold by the director and the proceeds
deposited in the fish and game account; or
2. In his discretion, order such confiscated wildlife given to a designated
tax-supported, nonprofit or charitable institution or indigent person.
According to the statute, if the elk was unlawfully taken by Kerr then it is subject to confiscation.
Statutory construction dictates that the Court look to the terms "unlawfully" and "taken."
As stated by our Idaho Supreme Court:
The word ..unlawful" has been defined as "[t]hat which is contrary to, prohibited,
or unauthorized by law. That which is not lawful. The acting contrary to, or in
defiance of the law; disobeying or disregarding the law. Term is equivalent to
without excuse or justification." black's Law Dictionary 1536 (6th ed.1990).
State v. Leferink,.133 Idaho 780, 783 (1999). Under this definition, Kerr's actions in trespassing

were unlawful. That is, his act of trespassing to retrieve the elk was in defiance of the law or, in
slightly gentler terms, contrary to or prohibited by the law.
The next question is whether Kerr's action of trespassing to retrieve the elk fits the
definition that he had "taken" the elk. "Take" is defined in J.C. § 36-202(i): "'Take' means
hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot. fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess or any attempt to so do."
Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 3
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Given the expansive definition of take, 1 there are a variety of ways in which Kerr may have
taken the elk. But specific to the issue at hand, the Court finds that Kerr's action in trespassing
was for the sole purpose of possessing an elk that he had shot. Or put another way, Kerr
trespassed (went onto someone else's property unlawfully) in order to possess (take) an elk.
Therefore, the elk was "unlawfully taken" by Kerr while he was actively trespassing.
Kerr argues that his taking or possession of the elk was lawful and that he was entitled to
possess the elk. 2 Kerr's argument is to parse his actions into a separate taking that was
accomplished prior to his trespass. The Court is not persuaded that Kerr's "taking" of the elk
was a separate, earlier completed act, unrelated to the taking that occurred while trespassing. It
was in the very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the taking - that is, except for
his trespass Kerr never possessed the elk. Under the broad definition of "take" it is also true that
Kerr did a taking when he shot or killed the elk. The fact that he took the elk by shooting it
(perhaps prior to trespassing if his account is to be believed) does nothing to diminish or wash
away the taint of the taking Kerr engaged in when he trespassed to possess the elk.

1 The

term "hunt" is further and more expansively defined in 36-202(j):
"Hunting" means chasing, driving, flushing, attracting, pursuing, worrying,
following after or on the trail of, shooting at, stalking, or lying in wait for, any
wildlife whether or not such wildlife is then or subsequently captured, killed,
taken, or wounded. Such term does not include stalking, attracting, searching for,
or lying in wait for, any wildlife by an unarmed person solely for the purpose of
watching wildlife or taking pictures thereof.

2 Kerr

makes an interesting analogy to a person possessing a ball that is kicked onto a neighbor's
property. To borrow that analogy, the Court sees this case more like a parent allowing a child to
have a ball so long as he follows the rules. When the child throws the ball into a neighbor's
flower garden and walks through the flowers to retrieve the ball, the parent is well within their
rights to confiscate the ball from the child for disobedience.

Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 4
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Kerr also argues that there are separate crimes related to "illegal taking" and "illegal
possessing" with which he was not charged or convicted. Kerr points out that there are
statutorily more stringent penalties associated with these crimes that are not in the trespassing
section. Kerr then reasons that LC.§ 36-1304(b) was only intended to apply to convictions of
specific crimes of "illegal taking" or "illegal possession." Kerr also argues that because the
Legislature did not detail the application of the confiscation statute to the trespassing statute that
the Legislature did not intend for it to apply.
Contrary to Kerr's narrow reading, I.C. § 36-1304(b) is not tied to or limited to
convictions of particular offenses. By its plain language, LC. § 36-1304(b) is a statute of broad
applicability across the spectrum of Fish and Game cases. It is a statute unrelated to penalties rather, it provides the authority for the Department of Fish and Game to dispose of wildlife.
Presumably, the rationale is that those who violate the law while hunting, fishing, trapping, etc.
ought not to profit from or get to keep the fruits of their illegal activity.
Kerr's other argument that the Legislature did not specifically detail the application of
LC. § 36-1304(b) helps make the point. The Legislature did not detail the application of I.C. §
36-1304(b) to any particular section of the code. That is, of course, because it is generally
applicable whenever unlawfully taken wildlife is involved.

CONCLUSION
In summary, Kerr could not possess this elk without committing the illegal act of
trespassing. Accordingly, under LC. § 36-1304(b) the elk shall remain confiscated by the

I

I

I

Kerr
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Department of Fish and Game. and Kerr· s request to reconsider is denied.
DATED this

3/~day of May, 2016.

ont C. Berecz
Magistrate Judge

Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 6
00022

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 31st day of May, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Brian Calder Kerr
252 West Meadow Ridge
Eagle, ID 83616
U.S. Mail

Hand-Delivered

X

To Defense Counsel

Faxed

Valley County Prosecutor
PO Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611
_ _ U.S. Mail _ _ Hand-Delivered _X_ Interdepartmental Box _ _ Faxed

Gabriel M Haws
Stewart Taylor & Morris PLLC
12550 W Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, ID, 83713

_X_ U.S. Mail _ _ Hand-Delivered _ _ Interdepartmental Box _ _ Faxed

DOUGLAS A. MILLER
Clerk of the District Court
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Daniel W. Bower. ISB #7204
Gabriel M. Haws, ISB #6999
STEWART TAYLOR & MoRRIS PLLC
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461
dbower@stm-law.com
ghaws@stm-law.com

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
BRIAN C. KERR,
Defendant.

TO:

THE STATE OF IDAHO, THE VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54, the defendant,

Brian C. Kerr, hereby appeals to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Valley from the Memorandum Decision. entered in the aboveentitled action on May 31, 2016, Honorable Lamont C. Berecz presiding.
(a)

This appeal is taken upon matters of law.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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(b)

Testimony and proceedings at the sentencing hearing were recorded. The person

responsible and/or in possession of the recording or reporting of that sentencing hearing is the
Magistrate Court Clerk.

(c)

The issues on appeal are as follows:
1)

Did the Magistrate Court misapply Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and
§ 36-202(i) where there was a finding that the Defendant harvested and
took game illegally prior to the trespass and no finding that the taking was
unlawful prior to the"trespass?

2)

Are Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-1304(b) unconstitutionally vague
and unenforceable as to the Defendant?

DATED this 12th day of July, 2016.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS

e

. o

PLLC

r

brie] M. Haws
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1ih day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Valley County Prosecutor's Office
219 N. Main St.
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124
Email:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C

vs.

ORDER ESTABLISHING
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
BRIAN CALDER KERR,

Defendant.

Having reviewed the Notice of Appeal filed by Defendant-Appellant Brian Kerr on July
12, 2016, the Court determines under I.C.R. 54.6(c) that this appeal involves only a question of
law, so no transcript is needed and the appeal will be decided on the clerk's record, the parties'
briefs, and oral argument. The question to be decided is whether, under LC.§ 36-1304(b), an elk
was "taken unlawfully" by the defendant or was "unlawfully in the [defendant's] possession"
where the defendant lawfully shot the elk while it was on private land, but before dying the elk
moved onto private land, upon which the defendant unlawfully trespassed to retrieve it. 1

1 Kerr's

notice of appeal also asks the Court to decide whether section 36-1304(b) is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The Court is not aware of that issue having been
presented to Magistrate Judge Berecz. As such, it has not been preserved for appellate review.
Consequently, the Court does not intend to solicit briefing on it. That said, if Kerr contends he
raised the issue before Judge Berecz, or that the issue for some reason may be raised for the first
time on appeal, he may seek reconsideration of this order.

ORDER ESTABLISHING APPELLATE PROCEDURE - 1
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•
Kerr's opening brief on appeal is due on September 2, 2016. Plaintiff-Respondent State
of Idaho's response brief then comes due within the timeframe for which I.A.R. 34(c) provides.
Kerr's reply brief, if any, likewise comes due within the timeframe for which that rule provides.
The Court will set the matter for oral argument promptly after the briefing is complete.
If either party contends some other appellate procedure would be more appropriate, that

party may file a motion to modify this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 7-.,J._ day of August 2016.

J
D. Scott
D~TJUDGE

ORDER ESTABLISHING APPELLATE PROCEDURE - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the

,;;4

day of August 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct

copy of the within instrument to:

Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
Daniel W. Bower
Gabriel M. Haws
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC
12550 W Explorer Dr, Ste 100
Boise, ID 83713

DOUGLAS MILLER
Clerk of the District Court
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Filed..

STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PI.LC

12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone: (208) 345-3333
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461

ghaws@stm-law.com

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C

MOTION TO CONTINUE ORAL
ARGUMENT

vs.
BRIAN C. KERR,

Defendant.

COMES NOW. above-named Defendant, by and though counsel of record. Stewart
Taylor & Mon-is PLLC, and moves this Court for an order continuing Oral Argument currently
scheduled on November 21, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. An Affidavit of Counsel setting forth the basis

for this Motion is filed conj'Fporaneously herewith.
DATED t h l s ~ y of November, 2016.
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC

MOTIONTOCONTINUEORALARGUMENT-1
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I hereby certify that on this_._ day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Valley County Prosecutor's Office
219 N. Main St.
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade. ID 83611

D
D

~

MOTION TO CONTINUE ORAL ARGUMENT - 2

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered

Facsimile: (208) 382-7124
Email:
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Log of lV-CRTl on 12/19/201.

Description KERR, BRIAN CALDER CR-2015-4470-C
JUDGE: JASON D SCOTT
PROSECUTOR: VALLEY COUNTY
DEFENSE COUNSEL: GABRIEL HAWS
CLERK: C. WHITE
BAILIFF: G. PRICE
COURT REPORTER: D. CROMWELL
/19/2016

Location

er

I1V-CRT1

Note
Calls Case

02:52:19 PM Defense
Counsel
02:52:32 PM

Judge

I am Mr. Bauer, with the same law firm, on behalf of Mr. Kerr.
I have read the parties briefs file in support of and opposition of
this appeal. I suppose a critical issue is the appellants position
lays on the idea that the elk was taken when it was shot and the
shot occurred on lawful hunting grounds. The argument then
goes on, since the shooting amounted to a lawful taking, that
establishes the taking was lawful regardless of other aspects
that were unlawful. Gist is how the statute defining take and
justifies

02:54:20 PM Defense
Counsel

Argument for the record. Two things. Memorandum statement.
Think the issue was addressed.

02:55:54

Judge

Reading a lot into that. Magistrate did not mention void for
vagueness.

Defense
Counsel

Concede it does not. Think we can make a good argument there ·
is a problem. Second argument is more broad. Court noted our
argument. 2nd paragraph on page 4. Argument was that
pursuant to the statute there was two takings.

02:56:14 PM

•

nt things.
Continued argument. Court recognized this is a broad definition
and it is too broad. Those are the two arguments we assert.
02:59:18 PM
Judge
02:59:47 PM Defense

Counsel
03:00:04 PM Defense
Counsel
03:00:39 PM Judge

Pointing to things you are trying to infer about the magistrates
decision. Haven't pointed me to anything you filed or made to try
and substantiate you did raise the argument.
I would respectfully disagree. His decision references our
argument.
Constitutes fundamental error. Issue at sentencing.
Can you wait until your reply brief on appeal when inferring
00032
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fundamental error.
03:00:57 PM

-
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Judge

This is the same, could you wait until your reply brief to argue
fundamental error.

Defense
Counsel

Will let the state argue that, but think the case law addresses
that. You don't have to raise it on appeal. Magistrate did
recognize the issue. Fundamental error. Would like to address
the substance to the constitutional error. Will make my argument
shorter.

03:01:15 PM

03:02:58 PM Defense
Counsel

Subsequent argument is that the 4th amendment be worded
with sufficient clarity.

03:04:51 PM
Defense
Counsel

Legislature can say whatever they want to say. The problem is it
gives an expansive definition. This gets to the nub of the issue.
The vague or misinterpretation. If the charge is taken away and I
am left with the trespassing, am I still bound to the other statute.
Magistrate Judge specifically states ... Kerr did a taking when he
shot and killed the elk. I do not envy your or an appellate judge.
Magistrate Judge recognized that issue and didn't want to deal.

Judge

Isn't the upshot that if he does anything illegal he is subject to
forfeiture. He can do things lawfully, but if anything else that is
done is unlawful, then he forfeits it. I don't think it's that deep.

03:07:57 PM

03:08:57 PM Defense
Counsel

Would agree. We're supposed to be great word smiths. A
person of ordinary intelligence

03:09:32 PM

Does it matter to your argument and void for vagueness, you're
challenging what a separate provision of the statutory scheme
makes this

Judge
03:10:09 PM Defense
Counsel
03:10:19 PM

Judge

So not challenging the conviction? Conviction of violating one
statute.

Defense
Counsel

I appreciate what you are saying and think it's important for the
constitutionality of it. Interesting case law, didn't site in my brief.
US Bums v. United States. Talks about the failure to give notice
to address higher charges. Due process. Triggers our argument.

Judge

You think your client should be able to keep while in the process
of breaking the law to get it?

03:10:42 PM

03:13:17 PM

I think that's the purpose of as applied challenge.

03:13:35 PM Defense
Counsel

The statute says unlawful taking, if I took it lawfully, can I be
held responsible?

03:14:01 PM

Judge

If we assume he took it lawfully, shooting is a definite taking, it
moves to what he did next, which was trespassing.

Judge

Don't know the answer to that. One option would have been to
contact the home owner.

03:14:29 PM
03:14:44 PM

Continued argument. I think the prosecutor and defense counsel I
00033
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Defense
Counsel
03:16:00 PM Defense
Counsel

Page 3 of3

should have had more discussion. It's so hard, I don't think
enough care and attention was provided during that stage with
what everyone expected and how it played out. Think my guy
had the expectation he would be allowed to keep the elk.
Based on what an ordinary person would think upon reading the
!.tatute.

03:16:15 PM Judge
03:16:16 PM

State

Considering how much time I have had to spend on this case, I
wish I hadn't have made a deal. It bares to mention that two
family members had charges that were dropped in this
agreement. In the sentencing he did not testify. The only
testimony was by fish and game. At the end of the day, wildlife
belongs to the state of Idaho and to it's people. It could be a
good tool here. If I shoot an elk and wound it and it runs away.

State

Continued argument. I would have taken it under the statute. It
would be an absurd thing to do, it goes without saying. These
statutes are practical in a way. The Elk belongs to fish and
game. They unlawfully retrieved an elk on private property and
they don't get to keep it.

Defense
Counsel

I am confused, we are not asserting it belongs to us. I think,
what the prosecutor mentions highlights some of the confusion
here. Legislature could have been more clear on this. I think all
of these other circumstances highlight the magistrates
frustration.

Judge

Decision will be under advisement and will be delivered
promptly.

03:18:16 PM

03:20:46 PM

03:22:20 PM
n~·??:21 P~

Adjourned
Produced by FTR Gold™
www. fortherecord. com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2015-04470-C

vs.

OPINION ON APPEAL
BRIAN CALDER KERR,

Defendant.

Brian Kerr appeals the magistrate's decision that an elk he shot, ostensibly on public
land, is subject to confiscation by the Idaho Department of Fish and Grune because, to retrieve it,
he trespassed on cultivated private land, where the elk died. Kerr contends the magistrate
misapplied the confiscation statute, LC. § 36-1304(b)(i). Alternatively, he says the statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. But, as explained below, it unrunbiguously provides
for the result the magistrate reached. The magistrate's decision therefore is affirmed.

I.
BACKGROUND
On October 15, 2015, Kerr shot an elk in Valley County. According to him, both he and
the elk were on a public hunting ground when he shot it. The State ofldaho disagrees. In any
event, Kerr and the State agree that Kerr trespassed on cultivated private land to retrieve the elk
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after it died, and, by doing so, committed a misdemeanor violation of LC. § 36-1603(a). Fish
and Game cited Kerr for trespassing and, based on his trespassing, confiscated the elk.
On February 8, 2016, Kerr filed a written guilty plea to the trespassing charge. He was
sentenced and a judgment of conviction was entered on March 14, 2016.
During the sentencing hearing, the magistrate determined that Fish and Game was
entitled to retain the elk rather than release it to Kerr. The magistrate agreed, however, to wait
thirty days before signing an order under LC. § 36-1304(b)(i) for the elk's confiscation by Fish
and Game, giving Kerr an opportunity to seek reconsideration on that point.
On April 11, 2016, Kerr filed what amounts to a motion to reconsider, arguing that the
magistrate misapplied the statute. A hearing was scheduled for May 10, 2016, after which the
magistrate took the motion under advisement. Three weeks later, on May 31, 2016, the
magistrate issued a memorandum decision denying reconsideration.
Kerr filed a notice of appeal on July 12, 2016. In his notice of appeal, he raised two
issues. The first is the issue he raised before the magistrate: whether section 36-1304(b )(i)
provides for the elk's confiscation. The second is a new issue he didn't raise before the
magistrate: whether section 36-1304(b)(i) is unconstitutionally vague as applied here.
About three weeks after Kerr filed his notice of appeal, the Court issued an order
establishing the procedures to be followed on appeal, including setting the briefing schedule. As
the order says, the Court determined that the appeal involves only a question of law, namely
whether section 36-1304(b)(i) provides for confiscation of an elk Kerr lawfully shot while on a
public hunting ground, but which moved before dying onto cultivated private land, upon which
Kerr trespassed to retrieve it. This is the question presented by Kerr's first appeal issue. The
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order also noted the Court's intention not to solicit briefing on Kerr's second appeal issue, as he
didn't raise that issue before the magistrate.
Kerr nevertheless argued both issues in his opening brief, failing even to acknowledge the
Court's expressed concern that he didn't raise the void-for-vagueness issue before the magistrate
and therefore is foreclosed from raising it on appeal. In its brief, the State asserted that Kerr
waived his void-for-vagueness argument by not raising it before the magistrate. On reply, Kerr
contended that he indeed had made that argument to the magistrate, citing as proof the
magistrate's reference to his "other argument" (Memorandum Decision 5), without pointing to
anything in the brief he submitted to the magistrate or to any statement he made in open court in
front of the magistrate. In context, the magistrate's reference to Kerr's "other argument" gives
no indication the magistrate perceived Kerr to have made a void-for-vagueness argument.
(Memorandum Decision 5.) Kerr simply did not make any such argument.
Oral argument was held on December 19, 2016, at which point the Court took the matter
under advisement, telling the parties its decision would be issued right away.

II.

ANALYSIS
Fish and Game may confiscate any wildlife "taken unlawfully." I.C. § 36-1304(b)(i). In
this context, "take" means, among other things, "hunt, pursue, ... shoot, ... kill, or possess or
any attempt to do so." LC. § 36-202(i) (emphasis added). 1 "The word 'or' is disjunctive,
meaning that it is a conjunction used to introduce an alternative." State v. Herren, 157 Idaho

Section 36-202's prefatory language says its definitions apply whenever the defined terms are
used in Title 36 of the Idaho Code, and it says "[t]he present tense includes the past and future
tenses, and the future, the present." J.C.§ 36-202. Thus, the meaning of the word "taken," as
used in section 36-1304(b)(i), is set by section 36-202(i)' s definition of the word ''take."
1
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722,726,339 P.3d 1126, 1130 (2014). It follows that Fish and Game may confiscate an elk
from a hunter who unlawfully hunted it, unlawfully pursued it, unlawfully shot it, unlawfully
killed it, or unlawfully possessed it, or who unlawfully attempted to do any of those things. The
hunter might have done one or more of those things lawfully, but doing any one of them
unlawfully subjects him to confiscation of his kill. By his own admission, Kerr acted unlawfully
in gaining possession of the elk he shot. That is the bottom-line reason the magistrate's decision
was correct and Kerr's appeal fails.
Although the case is straightforward enough that the Court could end its analysis there,
the Court will proceed to address Kerr's arguments in detail. Kerr contends he shot the elk
lawfully because he had the necessary hunting tag and he and the elk were located on a public
hunting ground when he shot it. The magistrate made no finding as to whether Kerr in fact shot
the elk on public land. Instead, the magistrate effectively took that as a given, despite the
parties' dispute on the point. It didn't matter whether Kerr shot the elk lawfully, the magistrate
concluded, because after shooting it he proceeded to possess it unlawfully, admittedly
trespassing on cultivated private land in violation of LC. § 36-1603(a) to gain possession.2
The magistrate's view is indisputably correct as a matter of statutory interpretation
because it gives effect to the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the statute's words. See, e.g.,

Wright v. Ada Cty., 160 Idaho 491,497,376 P.3d 58, 64 (2016). Kerr may have shot the elk
lawfully, but he violated the la\V against trespassing on cultivated private land in order to gain
possession of it after shooting it. Thus, even assuming he shot the elk lawfully, he unlawfully
possessed it, triggering Fish and Game's confiscation right under section 36-l 304(b)(i).

The word "possession" is defined fi.)r this purpose in LC. § 36-202(m). Kerr doesn't argue that
he neither gained nor attempted to gain possession of the elk according to that definition.

2
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Moreover, according to his own version of events-in which he lawfully shot the elk on public
land and trespassed on cultivated private land to retrieve it-he unlawfully pursued the dying elk
because he pursued it after shooting it by trespassing on cultivated private land, triggering that
same confiscation right in a second way.
Kerr's arguments to the contrary are not well taken. His principal argument is that, by
shooting the elk lawfully, he "took" it lawfully, and because the same elk logically can't be
"taken" twice, the elk he shot wasn't "taken" again when he unlawfully gained possession of it
by trespassing on cultivated private land to retrieve it. The fundamental problem with this
argument is that nothing in the statute suggests an elk can only be ''taken" once.
As already noted, "take" is a statutorily defined term. Its meaning is very broad and isn't
synonymous with "kill" (though that is one way to "take" an elk). I.C. § 36-202(i). Of course an
elk can't be killed more than once. But, given the statutory definition of"take," the same elk can
be "taken" multiple times. Indeed, Kerr first "took" the elk by "hunting" it, even before he shot
it. See LC. § 36-202(i) (providing that to "hunt" is to ''take"); LC. § 36-202(i) (defining
"hunting" essentially as trying to capture or kill wildlife, whether successfully or not). He may
well have ''taken" the elk a second time by "pursuing" it (if it happened to have been necessary
for him to pursue the elk after seeing it but before shooting it). Then he ''took" it another time by
"shooting" it, perhaps another time by "killing" it (if shooting it alone weren't enough to cause
its death), and still another time by "pursuing" the dying elk onto cultivated private land.
Finally, he ''took" the elk by "possessing" it.
Kerr's principal argument-that one act qualifying as "taking" the elk bars any
subsequent act from also qualifying as ''taking" the elk-is without statutory grounding. And
applying his logic to the confiscation statute would yield the absurd result that one who lawfully
OPINION ON APPEAL - 5
00039

"hunts" an elk-and thus under section 36-202(i) "takes" the elk before having shot, killed, or
possessed it-is free of the risk of confiscation, no matter how he many fish-and-game laws he
violates in ultimately shooting, killing, or possessing it. The magistrate's correct interpretation,
by contrast, sensibly places a hunter at risk of confiscation unless every act that qualifies as
"taking" the animal at issue is a lawful one.
Kerr also argues that the confiscation statute has no application when the hunter's only
unlawful behavior is violating the statute he violated, section 36-1603(a). This argument fails
because nothing in the confiscation statute, or elsewhere in the fish-and-game statutory scheme,
suggests any such limitation on the scope of the confiscation statute. The confiscation statute
applies by its own terms whenever wildlife is unlawfully taken. LC.§ 36-1304(b)(i). It doesn't
list any particular fish-and-game statute or statutes that must be violated for it to apply,
indicating that it was intended-just as it says-to apply whenever the animal to be confiscated
was "taken" through unlawful conduct. The magistrate did not err by declining to read a
limitation into the confiscation statute that simply isn't there. Moreover, the statute Kerr
violated, which he mischaracterizes as a mere trespass-to-retrieve statute, proscribes not only
trespassing on private land to retrieve wildlife, but also trespassing on private land to hunt
wildlife. LC.§ 36-1603(a). By his logic, a hunter who trespasses on private land to kill an elk
hasn't subjected himself to confiscation of his kill because he merely violated the trespassing
statute. That result is as unsound logically as it is lacking in statutory support.
For these reasons, the magistrate didn't misapply the confiscation statute.
But that isn't the end of the inquiry, as Kerr has argued that the confiscation statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Although he now says otherwise, he simply didn't
raise that argument in front of the magistrate. "[I]ssues not raised below generally may not be
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considered for the first time on appeal." State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,912,265 P.3d 519,525
(Ct. App. 2011 ). Thus, unless it was "fundamental error" for the magistrate not to find the
confiscation statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to Kerr, despite Kerr's failure to so
argue, this alleged error is unreviewable. See id. at 913,265 P.3d at 526. Moreover, even on
appeal, Kerr waited until filing his reply brief to begin arguing that this alleged error is
"fundamental error." That is too late, as issues first raised in the appellant's reply brief will not
be considered. E.g., Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604,612,364 P.3d 951,959 (2015). Thus,
Kerr faces two procedural bars, one for waiting until appeal to raise his void-for-vagueness
argument and the other for waiting until his reply brief on appeal to characterize as "fundamental
error" the magistrate's failure to sua sponte find the confiscation statute unconstitutionally vague
as applied to him.
There is no good reason Kerr should be permitted to avoid the effect of the latter of those
two procedural bars. In its order establishing the procedures for this appeal, the Court expressly
noted Kerr's failure to raise his void-for-vagueness argument before the magistrate and his
consequent inability to assert that issue on appeal. Thus, Kerr was on notice before the briefing
schedule began that the Court regarded the void-for-vagueness issue as untimely. Ifhe wished to
pursue that issue anyway, he should've argued in his opening brief that the "fundamental error"
doctrine permits him to do so. His failure to make that argument at the appropriate time
prevented the State from briefing whether the alleged error is reviewable as "fundamental error."
The latter procedural bar therefore thus eliminates the need to address whether Kerr can avoid
the effect of the former procedural bar by characterizing the alleged error as "fundamental error."
Regardless, if the Court nevertheless addresses on the merits Kerr's assertion that he is
the victim of "fundamental error" by the magistrate, the Court finds that assertion incorrect. An
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error is "fundamental error" if it: "(1) [it] violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any
additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings. Pentico, 151 Idaho at 913, 265 P .3d at 526. Beginning with
the first element, the constitutional right at issue is the due-process right not to be held to account
under an unconstitutionally vague statute. That right was waived when Kerr failed to argue
before the magistrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Cf State v.

Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 503, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001) ("We are not persuaded that it
amounts to fundamental error to allow a defendant to waive a challenge that a statute is
overbroad as applied."). Thus, the constitutional right at issue isn't "unwaived." Regardless,
moving to the second element, Kerr hasn't shown any error at all, much less a clear or obvious
one. The confiscation statute's proper application to this case is perfectly clear: unlawfully
taken wildlife may be confiscated by Fish and Game, and wildlife is unlawfully taken if the
hunter pursues it or gains possession of it unlawfully, such as by trespassing on cultivated private
land to retrieve it.
The magistrate correctly decided the elk was taken unlawfully and therefore subject to
confiscation under section 36-1304(b)(i). Accordingly, that decision is affirmed.

t\-)
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